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Nowadays, there is an increasing number of applications and systems requiring strong security on
small devices. Public-key cryptography (PKC) is mandatory for providing key exchange and digital
signature. The first standard for public-key crypto-systems was RSA. However, to be compliant with
the recommended theoretical security levels, RSA based crypto-systems must use large keys – at least
two thousand bits – which makes it too costly for embedded applications.
Curves based cryptography such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) or Hyper-Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy (HECC) is known to provide a given security level at a lower cost than RSA. For instance, 226-bit
ECC keys offer the same security level as 2048-bit RSA. Due to its reduced cost and better performance,
ECC is now recommended as the standard for public-key crypto-systems.
Recent research has pointed out HECC as an attractive alternative to ECC. HECC is based on a
different kind of curves, which allows the size of the computed data to be halved, but at the expense of an
increased number of finite field operations. In [1], Renes et al. present software implementations of key
exchange and signature schemes based on HECC and Kummer surfaces, targeting embedded processors
(ARM Cortex M0 and AVR ATmega). The provided results show very interesting speedups compared
to state-of-the-art ECC: 30% speedup for Diffie-Hellman key exchange and up to 70% for signature.
As pointed out above, operations on HECC involve more operations on the underlying finite field than
ECC. However, one can observe that in ECC, most of the computations are dependent and must be mostly
done in a sequential way. For this reason, the internal parallelism in ECC is quite limited compared
to HECC. For instance, in the formulas presented in [1], one can find regular patterns of four to eight
independent modular multiplications – the most costly and common finite field operation – feasible in
parallel. HECC internal parallelism brings forward numerous questions for hardware implementations.
Those questions can be summarized as follows: how can one take advantage of the parallelism of HECC
to design efficient hardware crypto-systems?
Our research group has been studying arithmetic operators and implementations of hardware accel-
erators for ECC, with robustness against physical attacks such as Side Channel Analysis (SCA) or faults
injections. We are now designing hardware accelerators for HECC scalar multiplication by exploring dif-
ferent types of architectures. We developed a specific CABA (Cycle Accurate, Bit Accurate) simulator
for our architectures. With this simulator, we can study the impact of the type, number and size of the
arithmetic units and of the choice between different types of parallel architecture on the performances,
circuit area and resistance against physical attacks. We will also compare different ways to manage
internal data transfers and different control flow implementations. The most interesting configurations
will be implemented on FPGA and evaluated on our attack setup.
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